Introduction
The expression "information economy" (or the alternative buzz words "new", "cyber", "network" and "e-economy") is used with considerable -and sometimes excessive -frequency nowadays. To give the expression proper contents, let us make clear that the general idea of an "information economy" includes two interrelated notions. On the one hand, the information economy refers to the industries primarily producing, processing, and distributing information; these industries form together a so-called "information sector" which contributes an increasing share to wealth and job creation. 1 On the other hand, the information economy also encompasses the idea that every industry makes an increasing use of information and information technology to reorganize, make themselves more productive, and create new ways of doing business. 2 
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To clarify matters further, it is convenient to divide the objects of economic transactions in the information economy into two complementary sides: the content (or information) side and the infrastructure (or technology) side. On the content side, the basic unit that is transacted is information. Following Varian (1998), we take information very broadly as anything that can be digitized (i.e., encoded as a stream of bits): text, images, voice, data, audio and video. Basic information is transacted under a wide range of formats or packages (which are not necessarily digital). These formats are generically called information goods. Books, movies, music, magazines, software, games, databases, telephone conversations, stock quotes, web pages, news, ring tones, etc all fall into this category. On the infrastructure side, we define as information technologies all the technologies for recording, conditioning, transmitting, distributing, using and processing information. Examples of information technologies are hardware and software platforms for office automation systems, telecommunication equipment such as servers, bridges, routers, hubs and wiring.
Information goods have the distinguishing characteristic of involving high fixed costs but low (often zero) marginal costs. In this case, cost-based pricing is not a sensible approach for firms and must give way to value-based pricing: an information good must be priced according to the value consumers attach to it, not according to its production cost. Moreover, as different consumers generally attach very different values to the same information good, the producer should set not a single but several value-based prices for its information good. This practice is known as price discrimination. More precisely, price discrimination implies that two varieties of a good are sold (by the same seller) to two buyers at different net prices, the net price being the price (paid by the buyer) corrected for the cost associated with the product differentiation. 3 We begin by addressing the feasibility of price discrimination. In a perfectly competitive market, there cannot be two different prices for the same product, for it would otherwise be possible to earn a profit by engaging in arbitrage, i.e., by buying at the low price and selling at the high price. Implicit behind this "law of one price" are the assumptions that arbitrage is perfect (costless) and that agents are perfectly informed about the different prices. However, in the real world (and especially in the information economy), examples abound in which different prices are observed for what is apparently the same product.
gence in communication and computing technologies, and (iii) the swift growth of network computing (due to the development of the Internet).
First, it must be the case that firms enjoy some market power, so that they are in a position to set prices. Second, letting aside the possibility of imperfect consumer information, it must be that arbitrage costs are so high that consumers do not find it profitable to transfer the good between them. 4 Let us now distinguish between different types of price discrimination. Following Pigou (1920) , it is customary to distinguish three different types, according to the information that firms have about buyers. The most favorable case for the firm is when it has complete information about individual preferences. The firm is then able to charge an individualized price for each buyer and for each unit purchased by each buyer, thereby extracting all of the consumer surplus. In Pigou's taxonomy, this practice is known as first-degree price discrimination (or perfect discrimination). Shapiro and Varian (1999) propose the more descriptive term of personalized pricing. It is often argued that personalized pricing cannot be applied in practice because of the enormous amount of information it requires. However, firms are now able to use information technologies in order to improve their knowledge of consumers' preferences and, thereby, to personnalize price offers. 5 When the firm does not know exactly each consumer's willingness to pay, it may still manage to extract a fraction of the consumer surplus by relying on some indicators (such as age, occupation, location) that are related to the consumers' preferences. If the firm can observe a buyer's characteristics, then it can charge different prices as a function of these characteristics. This type of price discrimination is referred to as third-degree price discrimination in Pigou's taxonomy, or as group pricing in Shapiro and Varian's. As group pricing can be seen as a special case of a multiproduct firm's pricing problem (see Tirole 1988), we shall not discuss it further in this paper.
When buyers' characteristics are not directly observable, the firm still has the option to use self-selecting devices in order to extract some consumer surplus. The idea is to discriminate between heterogeneous buyers by targeting a specific package (i.e., a selling contract that includes various clauses in addition to price) for each class of buyers. The firm faces then the problem of designing the menu of packages in such a way that each consumer indeed chooses the package targeted for her. Pigou describes this practice as seconddegree price discrimination, whereas Shapiro and Varian prefer to refer to it, more descriptively, as versioning. This practice is our main focus of attention in this paper. In Section 2, we present an integrated model which allows us to study how to implement versioning and when it is optimal to do so. Then, in Section 3, we consider a number of specific strategies for discriminating between consumers in the information economy: bundling or tying different goods together, creating a new version by disabling some functions of an existing version, and conditioning prices on purchase history. Section 4 gives some concluding remarks.
Versioning: how and when?
In the nineteenth century, Dupuit (a French engineer and economist, quoted by Ekelund 1970) analyses the practice of the three-class rail system as follows:
"It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the thirdclass seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches... What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from travelling third-class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich... And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to third-class passengers and mean to second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous."
What Dupuit describes is a classical example of versioning: by offering the same product under a number of "packages" (i.e., some combinations of price and product characteristics), the seller is able to sort consumers according to their willingness to pay. The key is to identify some dimensions of the product that are valued differently across consumers, and to design the product line so as to emphasize differences along those dimensions. The next step consists in pricing the different versions in such a way that consumers will sort themselves out by selecting the version that most appeals to them.
Examples of such practice abound in the information economy. The dimension along which information goods are versioned is usually their quality, which is to be understood in a broad sense (for instance, the quality of a software might be measured by its convenience, its flexibility of use, the performance of the user interface, ...). 6 Versioning of information goods can also be based on time or on quantity. 7 We now develop a simple model to understand how a monopolist should choose prices to induce self-selection of the consumers between different versions of the product. We also identify conditions under which versioning allows the monopolist to increase profits.
A simple model of versioning
We consider the problem of a monopolist choosing packages of quality and price level for an information good when consumers have unit demands. 8 The monopolist has identified one particular dimension of the good for which consumers have different value. In particular, we suppose that there is a continuum of potential consumers who are characterized by their valuation, θ , for this dimension of the information good. We assume that the "taste parameter" θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [ ] 1 0, . The monopolist can produce this dimension of the good at two levels of quality, which are given exogenously. We note the two levels 1 s and 2 s , with 1 2 s s > . As for the other dimensions of the information good, consumers are assumed to share the same valuation. Consumers' preferences are then described as follows: when consuming a unit of the good of quality i s sold at price i p , a consumer of type θ enjoys a (net) utility of
represents the common valuation for the other dimensions of the information good. We assume that 1 s k < , meaning that the consumer with the highest taste parameter ( ) 1 = θ values the particular dimension (at its lowest quality level) more than all the other dimensions of the good. Finally, we pose that a consumer's utility is zero if she refrains from buying.
users to pay a registration fee, or displaying ads), they illustrate how annoyance can be used as a discriminating device: some users will be willing to pay to turn off the annoying screen. 7 Time-based versioning follows the tactic of delay. For example, new books often appear first in hardcover and later as less expensive paperbacks. Similarly, movies can first be viewed in theaters; a few months later, they are released on DVD, and are shown on premium cable television; eventually, they are broadcast on terrestrial television. The price of these choices usually declines with the viewing date. Meurer (2001) gives some examples of quantity-based versioning for information goods: software site licenses often provide discounted royalties as the number of networked machines or users grow; online databases offer discounts based on number of users or on usage by a particular user (measured by the number of searches performed, the quantity downloaded or printed, etc); music performance licenses use factors like the number of square meters in a bar or store, or the size of the audience for a radio or TV station to set quantity-based royalties; magazine and newspaper subscriptions feature quantity discounts. 8 This problem was initially examined by Mussa and Rosen (1978) . We use here the results of the extended analysis of Bhargava and Choudary (2001 
Selling a single quality
Under Assumption 2, the monopolist will choose to produce quality 2 s if he decides to sell a single quality. For a given price 2 p of quality 2 s , the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying is identified by ( ) 
Selling the two qualities
We need now to find the profit maximising price pair ( ) 
These are the so-called self-selection constraints (also known as "incentive-
is to be feasible in the sense that it will be voluntarily chosen by the consumers, then consumers of each group must prefer consuming the package intended for them as compared to consuming the other group's package or not consuming any package. Constraint (A) states that the price of the high-quality version must be lower than the price of the low-quality version, augmented by the quality gap (as valued by the most eager consumer, i.e., 1 = θ ). This is a necessary condition for positive sales of the high-quality version. Constraint (B) states that the lowquality version must offer a better "quality-price ratio" (computed here as
for version i) than the high-quality one. This is a necessary condition for positive sales of the low-quality version.
, we can write the monopolist's profit-maximization problem as follows 
That is, the monopolist sets the price of the low-quality version ( ) 
The former condition shows that an increase in 1 p has a twofold effect on profits: on the one hand, revenues are gained on the consumers of the two versions but on the other hand, margins are lost from consumers of the low-quality version who leave the market because of the price increase. The latter condition indicates two similar effects: a higher premium ∆ gives rise to increased revenue from the consumers of the high-quality version but makes some consumers switch to the low-quality version (which is sold at a margin 
Do these prices meet the constraints? We first check that the market is not fully covered at these prices: our assumption that
, so that consumers with very low values of θ do not purchase any version. Next, a few lines of computations establish for which regions of parameters the self-selection constraints are met:
Conditions (A') and (B') are nothing but the self-selection constraints (A) and (B) expressed in the case of marginal-cost pricing (i.e., 
When is versioning optimal?
We have just shown that conditions (A') and (B') are necessary for versioning to be feasible. Using a simple "revealed preference" argument, we can also say that versioning is more profitable than selling a single version when conditions (A') and (B') are met. Indeed, if the monopoly decides to set a pair of prices that induces some consumers to purchase the low-quality version, it is because this strategy increases profits (otherwise, he would choose prices such that only the high-quality version is purchased).
Cannibalization vs market expansion
To understand the importance of the two conditions, let us detail the two conflicting effects versioning induces on the monopolist's profits (see Figure 1 ). Under conditions (A') and (B'), the marginal consumers in the two options are ranked as follows: Effects of versioning no effect no effect expansion cannibalization
That is, the effect of versioning on consumers' choices is twofold: first, because . Going down the distribution of θ , we encounter consumers who would buy quality 2 s if it were the only quality available, but who would buy quality 1 s otherwise. This cannibalization effect has the following negative impact on the monopolist's profit: 
Adding the two effects, we find that under conditions (A') and (B'), price discrimination is indeed the most profitable option:
Is versioning optimal for information goods?
Information goods have the distinguishing characteristic of involving high fixed costs but low (often zero) marginal costs. More generally, the marginal cost of production is invariant with product quality. In our setting, this would mean that c c c
. With c being near zero, we observe that assuming 1 0 s k < < suffices to guarantee that conditions (A') and (B') are met and that versioning is optimal. 9 Note that for 0
, we have that 
We record our main result below.
Suppose the consumers' utility for the information good can be separated along two dimensions: a "key dimension" for which consumers have different valuations, and a "secondary dimension" for which all consumers have the same, positive, valuation. Suppose also that some consumers value the key dimension more than the secondary dimension, and that the marginal cost of producing any level of quality for the key dimension is near zero. Then versioning the information good along the key dimension is the most profitable option for the monopolist.
9 However, if k = 0 and 2 1 c c = , condition (B') cannot be met and the monopolist will prefer to offer the high quality only. This is the result reached by Salant (1989) under the assumption that the marginal cost function for quality is linear.
Damaged goods
One extreme form of versioning occurs when firms intentionally damage a portion of their goods in order to price discriminate. Such "damaged good strategy" is widely used in software markets: initially, the producer develops a complete full-featured version and then introduces additional low-quality versions by degrading quality of the original version. Denekere and McAfee (1996) report other instances where firms actually incur an extra cost in order to produce the low-quality version. 10 They model this extra cost by assuming that the marginal cost of production is higher for the low quality version. In the above setting, this would mean that 0
. Continuing to assume that 1 0 s k < < , let us examine whether versioning could be optimal under this alternative scenario. Condition (A') is clearly satisfied as 0
. As for condition (B'), it can be satisfied if the "damaging cost" ( ) 2 1 c c − is not too large. We conclude that versioning can be feasible, and thus optimal, even if it is more costly to produce the low-quality version of the product.
Looking at the examples provided in Denekere and McAfee (1996) , one could argue that the damaged good strategy is more likely to require some additional fixed cost rather than an increase in marginal cost. In this case, supposing 0
and letting F > 0 denote the fixed cost of creating quality 1 s by damaging quality 2 s , we have that the damaged good strategy is optimal if and only if
Versioning: Applications
We discuss now three specific ways, observed in the information economy, of inducing consumers' self-selection in order to capture a larger share of the consumer surplus: bundling, functional degradation, and conditioning prices on purchase history.
Bundling
Just as inducing self-selection by offering a menu of versions enhances the monopolist's ability to extract surplus, so can selling different products as a combination package. Two such techniques are bundling and tying. The practice of bundling consists in selling two or more products in a single package (bundling is said to be "pure" when only the package is available, or "mixed" when the products are also available separately). The distinguishing feature of bundling is that the bundled goods are always combined in fixed proportions. In contrast, the related practice of tying (or tie-in sales) is less restrictive in that proportions might vary in the mix of goods. It takes only a little reflection to recognize how common practices bundling and tying are in the information economy. Examples abound both on the content side and on the infrastructure side, as illustrated below.
Examples of bundling in the information economy
Content side. (i) Subscription to cable television is typically to a package of channels together, rather than to each channel separately; similarly for subscription to magazines or for CDs (which can be seen as bundles of different songs). (ii) Software companies sell individual products but also offer packages (or "suites") consisting of several applications (e.g., Microsoft Office suite). (iii) Movie distributors frequently force theaters to acquire "bad" movies if they want to show "good" movies from the same distributor.
Infrastructure side. (i)
Computer manufacturers offer bundles that includes both a computer (a central processing unit) and a monitor. (ii) Audio equipment usually can be bought as separate components or as a complete system. (iii) Photocopier manufacturers offer bundles that include the copier itself as well as maintenance; they also offer the alternative of buying the copier and servicing separately. (iv) A classic example of tying was the practice adopted by IBM in the era of punch-card computers: IBM sold its machines with the condition that the buyer use only IBM-produced tabulating cards. Current examples involve computer printers (ink cartridges are generally specific to a particular model of a particular manufacturer) or some photographic films (only Polaroid films fit a Polaroid Instamatic).
Economists have given different explanations for bundling and tying. First, some explanations are too transparent to merit formal treatment. In the case of perfectly complementary products, such as matching right and left shoes, no one questions the rationale of bundling: there is virtually no demand for separate products and bundling them together presumably conserves on packaging and inventory costs. In other cases where products are not necessarily complements, various cost efficiencies might provide a basis for profitable bundling. More interestingly, even in the absence of cost efficiencies, there are demand side incentives that makes bundling and tying profitable strategies. On the one hand, both practices can serve as an effective tool for sorting consumers and price discriminate between them; it is this rationale we concentrate on in this section. 11 On the other hand, bundling and tying are also particularly effective entry-deterrent strategies; the recent case brought against Microsoft by the European Commission follows this line of argument. 12 We now present a simple example to illustrate the use of bundling as an alternative strategy for (second-degree) price discrimination. 13 Consider two monopolized products, which are independent both in terms of demand (i.e., the value a consumer places on one product does not depend on the consumption of the other product) and in terms of costs (i.e., there are no cost advantages of multiproduct production; in particular, we assume zero marginal cost for both goods). We still have a continuum of potential consumers who are characterized by a taste parameter θ , which is assumed to be uniformly 11 For related literature, see Adams and Yellen (1976) , Schmalensee (1984) or McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) . 12 Three papers addressing this topic are Whinston (1990) , Choi and Stefanidis (2003) and Nalebuff (2004) . 13 Regarding tying, let us simply mention that it can be viewed as a price discrimination device because it enables the monopolist to charge more to consumers who value the good the most. Here, the value consumers place on the primary product (e.g., the printer) depends on the frequency with which they use it, which is itself measured by their consumption of the tied product (e.g., the ink cartridges). Those who most need the primary product will consume more of the secondary product and, thereby, pay a higher effective price.
We now compare two options for the monopolist: either selling the two goods separately (separate sales), or selling them together as a bundle (pure bundling).
Separate sales
Let i p denote the price of good i (i = 1, 2). We identify two pivotal consumers.
− Consumer ( ) , she is better off buying nothing than buying good 2 only; moreover, as
, she is also better off buying nothing than buying good 1 only. Inverting the argument, we conclude that the monopolist will cover the whole market (i.e., sell at least one good to each and every consumer) if he sets prices so that , and the market is fully covered.
Collecting our previous results, we can compute the optimal profit under separate sales for all values of α : The intuition for this result is simple. By selling a bundle at a lower price, the monopolist attempts to attract consumers who place a relatively low value on either of the two goods but who are willing to pay a reasonable sum for the bundle. When the two goods are sold separately, these consumers would buy a single good, but when the goods are sold as a bundle, they would buy the bundle and, therefore, acquire a good they would not have purchased other-wise. Naturally, for such consumers to exist, the variation in consumer valuations of the goods must be significant.
Functional degradation
We now examine the logic behind a practice that becomes increasingly common nowadays: the functional degradation of computer software. Well-known examples of this practice are software like Acrobat Reader, RealPlayer, various Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) Viewers. These software are designed to view and print (or play) contents written in a specific format, but are not capable of producing the contents in the specific format. The software manufacturers provide typically two different versions of a product, the read-only (or play-only) version and the full version. They offer the viewer or player almost free of charge by allowing consumers to download it on the Internet. However, the viewer (or player) is viewing and printing (or playing) only. To be able to create and edit contents (as well as viewing or playing them), users need to purchase the corresponding full version, which is of course sold at a positive price. In the following simple model, based on Csorba and Hahn (2003), we show that this practice is based on a mixture of economic motivations: versioning, damaged good strategy, network building through free versions, and unbundling.
Suppose a firm is the sole supplier of a software which combines a read and a write function: the write function is required to produce documents that can be read using the read function. Since not all consumers are interested in writing documents, it is natural to offer the software under two versions: a full (write and read) version and a read-only version. 14 As before, we assume that there is a continuum of potential consumers who buy at most one unit of the good. A consumer is identified by a parameter θ (drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval), which indicates her valuation for the two functions of the good. More precisely, the valuations for the two functions are assumed to be proportional: θ is the valuation for the write function, while βθ (with 0 > β ) is the valuation for the read function. That is, we restrict the attention to cases where users who value highly one function also value highly the other function (and vice versa). 15 The software exhibits two-sided network effects, insofar as the users' utility from reading (resp. writing) increases with the number of writers (resp. readers). Letting f p and r p denote the prices of the full and of the read-only version, and f n and r n denote the number of consumers who buy the full and the read-only versions, we can express the (net) utility of consumer θ as follows: Let us detail this utility function. The full version can be seen as a bundle combining the two functions. Utility is assumed to be additively separable in the two functions. The first term is the utility from the write function: a user owning the full version enjoys a network effect exerted by the users able to read the documents she produces (i.e., those users who own either version of the good). The second term is the utility from the read function: the network effect, here, is exerted by the users able to write documents and is valued at βθ (instead of θ for the write function). Naturally, utility from owning the read-only version is limited to the latter term.
Because the firm cannot observe the consumers' types, it cannot resort to personalized pricing or group pricing. Two options are available: either sell the full version only (which can be seen as pure bundling), or sell the two versions (which is a form of versioning or of mixed bundling). We consider the two options in turn.
Sell the full version only
When selling only the full version, the firm is in the position of a monopolist pricing a good that exhibits network effects. If the read-only version is not available, r n is necessarily equal to zero and the consumer θ 's options are restricted to buying the full version (which yields a net utility of Because of the presence of network effects, there might exist more than one f n (that is, more than one quantity) that satisfies the equilibrium condition (6) for a given price. For instance, 0 = . We need thus a rule to choose between multiple solutions. We apply the Pareto criterion: if, at a certain price, there exist more than one number of consumers ("quantity") that satisfies the equilibrium condition and one of these "quantities" Paretodominates (i.e., makes everyone better off than) the other quantities, consumers expect this allocation to prevail in equilibrium. In the present case, the larger f n (which corresponds to the lower f θ ) that satisfies (6) gives a larger value to the network good, so everyone would be better off by coordinating on this solution. This is thus the value we pick when following the Paretocriterion.
We can now express the firm's problem as
The first-order condition for profit maximization is
, which admits two roots: 0 = f n and 3 2 / n f = . Checking for the second-order condition, we find that the former corresponds to a minimum while the latter corresponds to a maximum. It follows that, when selling the full version, the firm's optimal network size, price and profit are given by (with the superscript F meaning "full version only"):
( ) ( ) 27 1 4 9 1 2 3 2 β π β
Introduce the read-only version
The introduction of the read-only version aims at achieving versioning. The idea is to segment the market into two segments: the full version is targeted towards consumers with a high valuation, and the read-only version towards consumers with a low valuation. We can therefore follow the same methodology as in Section 2.1. We identify two pivotal consumers. Let fr θ denote the consumer who is indifferent between the two versions. That is, To achieve the desired segmentation, the firm must choose f p and r p so that Plugging the values of fr θ and ro θ into the latter two expressions, we can solve for the prices and derive the following two equilibrium conditions:
As before, there can be multiple pairs of ( ) . It can be shown, however, that different equilibrium pairs can always be ordered, in the sense that a larger value of f n always corresponds to a larger value of r n (see Csorba and Hahn 2003) . Since larger network sizes confer higher utility to all consumers, the Pareto criterion tells us that consumers expect the largest pair ( ) r f n , n satisfying (8) and (9) to be the equilibrium.
We can now write the firm's profit-maximisation problem in the case where the read-only version is used as a versioning device:
To find the (unconstrained) profit-maximising values of f n and r n , we proceed in three steps. First, solving for the FOC with respect to r n , we find that Second, we plug this value into the FOC with respect to f n , which then rewrites as
Third, we consider the two possible roots of the latter equation. Either β
. Using expression (10), we observe that for ( )
, while for
Since we impose
), we can reject the former solution.
As for the latter solution, it satisfies the constraints providing (i)
, and (ii) ( ) ( )
there are three cases to consider according to the value of β (i.e., the ratio between the valuations of the reading and writing functions).
If the reading function is valued relatively higher than the writing
, there is no interior solution to the above problem. The firm does not find it profitable to introduce the read-only version (which amounts to set 0 = r n ) and there is no versioning. To conclude, we summarize our findings.
If the reading function is valued relatively lower than
Consider a software that combines a read and a write function. Suppose that consumers' valuations for the two functions are proportional. As long as the reading function is valued relatively lower than the writing function, the seller finds it profitable to engage in versioning by selling a read-only version along with the full (read + write) version of the software. If the relative valuation of the reading function is sufficiently low, it is even profitable to give away the read-only version for free.
Conditioning prices on purchase history
In the e-commerce world, sellers are able to monitor consumer transactions, typically through the use of "cookies". A cookie is a unique identifier which is sent by a Web site for storage by the consumer's Web browser software. The cookie contains information about the current transaction and persists after the session has ended. As a result, at the next visit of the Web site by the consumer, the server can retrieve identification and match it with details of past interactions, which allows the seller to condition the price offers that he makes today on past behavior.
In other words, cookies make price discrimination on an individual basis feasible. Note that other technologies can be used toward the same objective: static IP addresses, credit card numbers, user authentication, and a variety of other mechanisms can be used to identify user history. Of course, users can take defensive measures. No one is forced to join a loyalty program, and it is possible to set one's browser to reject cookies or to erase them after a session is over.
In sum, online technologies allow e-commerce sellers to post prices, observe the purchasing behavior at these prices, and condition future prices on observed behavior. Yet, consumers are free to hide their previous behaviour (possibly at some cost) and can always pretend that they visit a web site for the first time. Therefore, as usual in versioning, sellers are bound to offer buyers some extra benefits in order to prevent them from hiding their identity.
We now extend the model of Section 2.1 to investigate this type of strategic interaction between buyers and sellers in an e-commerce environment. 16 A single profit-maximizing seller provides a good at constant marginal cost (which, for simplicity, is set to zero). The seller can set cookies for recording consumers' purchase history. However, consumers can delete cookies at some (inconvenience) cost denoted by 0 > γ . Consumers can visit the seller's online store in two consecutive periods. In period i = 1, 2, the utility from purchasing one unit of the good is described as in expression (1) 
Naturally, the seller will try to take advantage of cookies and condition prices on purchase history. To do so, the seller designs the following pricing scheme: (i) the price 0 p is charged to consumers having no cookie indicating a prior visit; (ii) the price b p is charged to consumers with a cookie indicating that they bought on a prior visit; (iii) the price n p is charged to consumers with a cookie indicating that they did not buy on a prior visit. We investigate how to implement a solution where consumers with a high θ consumes in both periods (and do not delete their cookie) and consumers with a lower θ consume only in the first period. We identify two pivotal consumers:
− consumer 0 θ is indifferent between buying in the first period only and not buying at all:
θ is indifferent between buying in both periods (and keeping her cookie) and buying in period 1 only:
If the proposed pricing scheme is correctly designed, the seller's profit writes as ; the difference between this price and the firstvisitor price is, however, inferior to the cost of deleting cookies. Finally, the price for consumers who visit the Web site for a second time but who have not purchased earlier, and the market cannot be segmented. 17 We can summarize our findings as follows.
As long as the cost of deleting cookies is large enough, conditioning prices on purchase history is feasible (and thus profitable). The seller sets a low price for (genuine or pretended) first visitors, and a higher price for identified second-time buyers; the difference between this price and the first-visitor price is inferior to the cost of deleting cookies. The price for consumers who visit the Web site for a second time but who have not purchased earlier is set high enough to discourage such behavior.
Conclusion
Price discrimination consists in selling the same product (or different versions of it) to different buyers at different prices. When sellers cannot relate a buyer's willingness to pay to some observable characteristics, price discrimination can be achieved by targeting a specific package (i.e., a selling contract that includes various clauses in addition to price) for each class of buyers. The seller faces then the problem of designing the menu of packages in such a way that each consumer indeed chooses the package targeted for her. This practice, known as versioning (or as second-degree price discrimination), is widespread in the information economy: it is not only particularly well-suited for information goods (for which consumers' valuations might differ widely), but it is also facilitated by the use of information technologies (which allow to create different versions of the same good at very low cost and along many possible dimensions).
In this paper, we have used a simple unified framework to expose the general theory behind versioning, and to consider a number of specific applications. In the general exposition, we have studied how to implement versioning and when it is optimal to do so. Applying the general analysis to information goods, we have shown that when the consumers' utility for an information good can be separated along two dimensions (a "key dimension" for which consumers have different valuations, and a `secondary dimension' for which all consumers have the same valuation), versioning the information good along the key dimension is the most profitable option for the monopolist.
We have then extended our theoretical framework to shed light on three specific versioning strategies used in the information economy: bundling, functional degradation and conditioning prices on purchase history. Bundling consists in selling different products as a combination package (like a word processor and a spreadsheet sold in an "office suite"). It is more profitable than separate sales if the correlation between the distributions of consumer utilities for the various goods comprised in the bundle is sufficiently negative. Under this condition, bundling induces a sufficient number of consumers to acquire a good they would not have purchased otherwise. Functional degradation is a practice by which a software firm removes some functions of its original product and sell the degraded version at a lower or zero price. For instance, Adobe sells Acrobat Reader along with Adobe Acrobat. The former software, available free of charge, is designed to view and print contents written in pdf format but is not capable of producing the contents in this format. To be able to create and edit contents, users need to purchase the latter software, which is sold at a positive price. In a model involving two-sided network effects, we have shown the following. As long as the reading function is valued (by all users) relatively lower than the writing function, the seller finds it profitable to engage in versioning by selling a read-only version along with the full (read + write) version of the software. If the relative valuation of the reading function is sufficiently low, it is even profitable to give away the read-only version for free. Finally, we have considered the practice of conditioning prices on purchase history. Indeed, online technologies allow e-commerce sellers to post prices, observe the purchasing behavior at these prices, and condition future prices on observed behavior. Yet, consumers are free to hide their previous behavior (possibly at some cost) and can always pretend that they visit a web site for the first time. Not surprisingly, the analysis revealed that the profitable use of such practice is conditional on the cost of hiding previous purchasing behaviour being sufficiently large.
